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Abstract
The amount of trust that can be placed in commodity computing platforms
is limited by the likelihood of vulnerabilities in their huge software stacks.
Protected-module architectures, such as Intel SGX, provide an interesting alter-
native by isolating the execution of software modules. To minimize the amount
of code that provides support for the protected-module architecture, persistent
storage of (confidentiality and integrity protected) states of modules can be del-
egated to the untrusted operating system. But precautions should be taken to
ensure state continuity: an attacker should not be able to cause a module to
use stale states (a so-called rollback attack), and while the system is not under
attack, a module should always be able to make progress, even when the system
could crash or lose power at unexpected, random points in time (i.e., the system
should be crash resilient).
Providing state-continuity support is non-trivial as many algorithms are vul-
nerable to attack, require on-chip non-volatile memory, wear-out existing off-
chip secure non-volatile memory and/or are too slow for many applications.
We introduce ICE, a system and algorithm providing state-continuity guar-
antees to protected modules. ICE’s novelty lies in the facts that (1) it does not
rely on secure non-volatile storage for every state update (e.g., the slow TPM
chip). (2) ICE is a passive security measure. An attacker interrupting the main
power supply or any other source of power, cannot break state-continuity. (3)
Benchmarks show that ICE already enables state-continuous updates almost 5x
faster than writing to TPM NVRAM. With dedicated hardware, performance
can be increased 2 orders of magnitude.
We present a machine-checked proof of ICE’s security guarantees and eval-
uate a prototype implementation on commodity hardware.
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ABSTRACT
The amount of trust that can be placed in commodity com-
puting platforms is limited by the likelihood of vulnerabili-
ties in their huge software stacks. Protected-module archi-
tectures, such as Intel SGX, provide an interesting alter-
native by isolating the execution of software modules. To
minimize the amount of code that provides support for the
protected-module architecture, persistent storage of (confi-
dentiality and integrity protected) states of modules can be
delegated to the untrusted operating system. But precau-
tions should be taken to ensure state continuity: an attacker
should not be able to cause a module to use stale states (a
so-called rollback attack), and while the system is not under
attack, a module should always be able to make progress,
even when the system could crash or lose power at unex-
pected, random points in time (i.e., the system should be
crash resilient).
Providing state-continuity support is non-trivial as many
algorithms are vulnerable to attack, require on-chip non-vo-
latile memory, wear-out existing off-chip secure non-volatile
memory and/or are too slow for many applications.
We introduce ICE, a system and algorithm providing state-
continuity guarantees to protected modules. ICE’s novelty
lies in the facts that (1) it does not rely on secure non-volatile
storage for every state update (e.g., the slow TPM chip). (2)
ICE is a passive security measure. An attacker interrupting
the main power supply or any other source of power, can-
not break state-continuity. (3) Benchmarks show that ICE
already enables state-continuous updates almost 5x faster
than writing to TPM NVRAM. With dedicated hardware,
performance can be increased 2 orders of magnitude.
We present a machine-checked proof of ICE’s security
guarantees and evaluate a prototype implementation on com-
modity hardware.
1. INTRODUCTION
Protection of sensitive data in commodity computing plat-
forms is extremely challenging. Modern operating systems
provide process isolation primitives, but the kernel itself is
too large to be implemented free from vulnerabilities. More-
over the operating system’s functionality is extended con-
tinuously to support new file systems, process scheduling
algorithms, peripherals, etc. Commodity systems are also
prone to physical attacks, even by ill-equipped and resource-
constrained home users [9, 14]. These vulnerabilities limit
the amount of trust that can be placed in commodity sys-
tems. In servers these limitations are remedied by pro-
grammable hardware security modules (HSMs). On client
devices, highly-sensitive applications such as online banking
or e-government often resort to smart cards. Unfortunately,
these solutions are expensive, cumbersome and the security
guarantees that they can provide to the overall applications
are limited.
Two recent advances in computer security indicate that
this situation may change in the near future. First, protec-
ted-module architectures (PMAs) have been developed that
provide strong isolation directly to modules running at ap-
plication level [4, 8, 24, 25, 27, 33, 37, 38, 45]. The OS is still
relied upon to provide services such as disk and network
access, but they are not trusted. Protected modules’ mem-
ory regions cannot be accessed from unprotected memory;
modules are in complete control over their own content and
can only be accessed through the interface they expose. Last
year Intel disclosed their work on Software Guard eXtension
(SGX) [3,15,26], their own hardware-implemented protected
module architecture for commodity processors. SGX goes
even further than other state-of-the-art protected-module
architectures and also provides protection against hardware
attacks; modules (called enclaves in SGX1) are only stored
in plaintext within the CPU package. When they are evicted
to main memory they are confidentiality, integrity and ver-
sion protected.
Second, Agten et al. [2] and Patrignani et al. [31] pro-
posed fully-abstract compilation techniques to such protec-
ted module architectures. While the strong isolation guaran-
tees offered by these architectures is vital, they are difficult
to implement without compiler support. Care must be taken
not to introduce software vulnerabilities during compilation.
Fully-abstract compilation ensures just this; machine-code-
level attacks exists iff also a corresponding attack at source-
code level exists. This enables easy reasoning and verifica-
tion of the security guarantees these modules provide.
Unfortunately an important attack vector has been largely
overlooked. Protected-module architectures, including SGX,
only provide strong isolation guarantees while the system
executes continuously. Without support for state continu-
ity, protected modules need to remain stateless, significantly
hampering their applicability. Consider as a running exam-
ple a password-checking module. To defend against dictio-
nary attacks, the user will be locked out indefinitely after
three failed attempts. The module confidentiality and in-
tegrity protects its state before handing it to the untrusted
operating system for storage. But when the module needs
1We will use the term “protected module” when referring to
isolated memory areas in any protected-module architecture
and use “enclave” when referring to SGX specifically.
to recover its state after a reboot, it cannot distinguish be-
tween a fresh and a stale state and the guess-limited security
measure cannot be guaranteed.
While having similarities with replay attacks at first glance,
the state itself is replayed in a rollback attack. Providing
support for state continuity is therefore much harder, es-
pecially when practical limitations are considered. Parno
et al. [30] show that many seemingly obvious algorithms are
flawed. Others are prone to simple hardware attacks. At-
taching an uninterruptible power source (UPS), for exam-
ple, may simply be disconnected. Or an in-kernel attacker
may prevent the execution of the interrupt handlers it re-
lies upon. Adding non-volatile memory on-chip could sim-
plify a solution, but requires modification of manufacturing
processes leading to increased manufacturing costs. Alter-
natively, using non-volatile memory off-chip (e.g., isolating
disk space) may be susceptible to a clone attack where a
hardware-level attacker may easily overwrite the state with
a previously recorded stale state. Using TPM NVRAM or
TPM monotonic counters instead, would foil such attacks,
but would significantly impact performance and usability.
Most implementations only provide 1,280 bytes of NVRAM
that supports only 100,000 write cycles over the chip’s life-
time [30]. Accessing NVRAM every second, would wear it
out in less then 28 hours. Monotonic counters, on the other
hand, only need to be incrementable every 5 seconds [44].
Hardware upgrades to the TPM chip could reduce some of
these architectural constraints, at an economic cost. How-
ever, any solution placing the TPM on the performance-
critical path, would require additional upgrades over time to
bridge the ever growing TPM/CPU performance gap. We
present ICE, an alternative solution that only requires TPM
accesses at boot time and is thus not affected by TPM speed.
ICE avoids architectural challenges (1) by proposing a
simple implementation technique where on-chip dedicated
registers are backed off-chip by a capacitor and persistent
memory. Upon a sudden loss of power, the contents of the
dedicated registers is written to persistent memory. (2) ICE
is a passive protection scheme; in the event of a crash or
power loss, security is guaranteed instantly. A hardware at-
tacker may disconnect the capacitor, but state continuity
remains guaranteed. (3) At the moment freshness informa-
tion is backed to persistent storage, it is considered public
data. Overwriting it with stale freshness information will be
detected upon recovery.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We present ICE, the first algorithm providing state-
continuity guarantees with a minimal TCB that does
not rely on the speed of secure, non-volatile memory
(e.g., the (slow) TPM chip) nor does it rely on an
uninterruptible power source.
• We formally verify and machine check the security
properties of ICE using the Coq proof assistant.
• Because SGX-enabled machines or emulators are not
yet available, we validate our claims based on a proto-
type implementation on top of Fides [37], an existing
hypervisor-based protected module architecture simi-
lar to SGX. Benchmarks show that states can already
be stored almost 5x faster on commodity hardware
than writing to TPM NVRAM. Dedicated hardware
support would increase performance substantially.
• We provide new insights that can steer the future de-
sign of hardware security modules e.g., the TPM.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First
we detail our attack model and the security properties that
we need to guarantee. Next in Sections 3 and 4, we present
our algorithm and discuss three possible implementations.
Finally, we evaluate the security and performance of ICE
and discuss how it can affect future directions of hardware
security modules.
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
2.1 Attacker Model
ICE can defend against an attacker with three powerful
capabilities. First, we assume that an attacker is able to
compromise the entire software stack, with the exception of
ICE-implementing modules. This enables versatile attacks
ranging from modifying the contents of the hard drive to
preventing enclaves from ever resuming execution.
Second, we assume that an attacker has control over the
system’s power supply or is able to launch attacks leading
to a similar result. Power-interruption attacks differ from
kernel-level crashes as they also affect software modules ex-
ecuting in complete isolation from the rest of the system:
modules may stop executing before they can commit their
new state. SGX enclaves are especially vulnerable to such
attacks. In order to prevent denial-of-service attacks by ma-
licious enclaves that never return control to the kernel, SGX
supports interruption of enclaves [17]. When the interrupt
is handled in the untrusted kernel, an in-kernel attacker can
easily prevent the enclave from ever resuming execution.
Third, we consider hardware attacks. We implement ICE
as a library that modules can be statically linked with and
take advantage of the security guarantees provided by the
protected-module architecture. In case of SGX this im-
plies that an attacker may place probes on memory buses
or perform cold boot attacks [14]. Defending against phys-
ical attacks against the CPU package itself or the TPM
chip [36,41,47] are orthogonal problems and not considered.
With respect to cryptographic capabilities of the attacker,
we assume the standard Dolev-Yao model [11]: cryptographic
messages can be manipulated, for instance by duplicating,
re-ordering or replaying them, but the underlying crypto-
graphic primitives cannot be broken.
We do not consider side-channel attacks in general (e.g.,
attacks based on cache behavior [28]) but similar to Parno
et al. [30] make one exception: we do consider attacks where
an attacker prevents the module from recording its new state
when she is able to infer (e.g., based on timing differences)
that this state would be unpreferable. When input is given
to a module, it should either complete the computation or
no valuable information should be deducible from it.
2.2 Security Properties
State continuity can be factored into two properties: safety
and liveness. To ensure safety, ICE must be resilient against
a rollback attack where an attacker provides the module with
a valid, but stale state. A rollback attack is related to a re-
play attack but it is much harder to defend against. Where
in a replay attack identical input is provided, the state of
the module itself is replayed in a rollback attack.
The second property, liveness, states that benign events
should never force the system into a state from which it can-
not progress. In practice this means that the system should
be allowed to crash at any time during the operation of the
algorithm, including when it is recovering from a previous
crash. Note that this is not the same as protection against
denial-of-service. Protection against denial-of-service is not
in scope; in-kernel attackers can easily prevent the system
from progressing (e.g., by removing the fresh state from disk,
or by breaking the kernel altogether). Liveness only ensures
progress is not hampered by random crashes. This is impor-
tant, since random crashes (or power loss) may occur even
when a system is not under attack.
2.3 Applicability
ICE’s high-speed state-continuity guarantees enable a large
range of applications:
Fortified Applications.
Almost all non-trivial applications need to keep some kind
of state: login credentials must not be rolled back to a
stale state, firewall settings must not be revertible and sys-
tems must be able to prove that stored log files are fresh
and have never been tampered with. State-continuity guar-
antees can also enable more privacy friendly applications.
Many use cases (e.g., road pricing or smart electricity me-
ters) require sensitive data to be collected and send to a
remote server. With strong hardware isolation, attestation
and state-continuity guarantees, a (possibly malicious) user
can download a software module that collects sensitive data
and only sends an aggregated value to a remote party. Pri-
vacy sensitive data does never have to leave the user’s sys-
tem. We will discuss in Section 7 how low-end devices can
also benefit from ICE.
A Building Block for Protocols.
High-performance, state-continuous storage enable pro-
tocols to provide stronger security guarantees. Consider
distributed algorithms as an example. Fault-tolerant algo-
rithms have been proposed to reduce the impact of failing
network participants (e.g., they may crash, process inputs
incorrectly or their local state may get corrupted), but there
is a theoretical upper bound that at most one third of the
participants may be faulty. Chun et al. proposed append-
only memory (A2M) [10] to harden existing distributed al-
gorithms and applications such as NFS. Acting as a trusted
log, this memory protects against equivocation; the ability
of a network node to make contradicting statements to dif-
ferent entities. The authors propose hardened versions of
PBFT [7], SUNDR [22] and Q/U [1], but leave implemen-
tation with a small TCB as future work. ICE is able to
implement fast, append-only memory almost trivially.
Avoiding the TPM Chip as a Bottleneck.
Many applications and protocols could also be implemented
based on guarantees provided by the TPM chip [30]. Unfor-
tunately the TPM was never designed with performance as
a main requirement and a wide application of this approach
would result in a severe bottleneck, especially in a server
setting where each client connection requires TPM access.
ICE avoids this bottleneck and other TPM constraints; a vir-
tually unlimited number of monotonic counters of variable
length can be provided, almost unlimited, never wearing-out
NVRAM can be offered, etc.
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Figure 1: ICE provides state-continuity guarantees
to isolated modules while trusting only a few key
components.
3. STATE-CONTINUITY AS A LIBRARY
Before introducing a running example and describing ICE
in full detail, we first introduce the system hardware we rely
on and discuss how freshness information is recorded.
3.1 Architecture
Assuming ICE is implemented on top of Intel SGX, we
only need to place trust in the CPU package and TPM chip
(see Figure 1). Attacks against any other component cannot
compromise security.
Enclaves.
Intel SGX, as any other protected-module architecture
[4, 8, 24, 25, 27, 33, 37, 38, 45], provides enclaves with total
control over their own code and data by enforcing a spe-
cific access control mechanism; only when executing within
the boundaries of an enclave can its content be accessed.
Access attempts from code running at any privilege level
outside the enclave (including from other enclaves), will be
blocked. Enclaves can only be accessed through an interface
they expose explicitly.
SGX can also make hardware attacks against enclaves sig-
nificantly more challenging by ensuring that their content is
only stored in plaintext inside the CPU package. The oper-
ating system may choose to write pages of enclaves to RAM
memory or swap disk, but only after they are confidential-
ity and integrity protected. Freshness data is included as
well to ensure that no stale pages can be swapped back in.
However, when the system shuts down or goes into hiberna-
tion or sleep mode, enclaves are destroyed and this freshness
information is lost [17]. Since enclaves live in the same ad-
dress space and maintain their state between invocations,
they can be seamlessly integrated in applications.
TPM.
We store long term secrets and freshness information in
TPM NVRAM. These secrets should only be accessible from
the SGX enclave that provided them.
Guarded Memory.
To enable fast state updates, we propose the addition of
a small amount of guarded memory; dedicated registers on-
chip that are backed off-chip by shadow, non-volatile mem-
ory (NVRAM) and a capacitor (see Figure 2). When a con-
troller detects that the main power supply is disconnected
from the CPU package, it copies the registers’ content to
non-volatile memory. When power is re-applied, the regis-
ters are restored. Note that only on-chip components need
to be trusted. Attacks against shadow memory, main power
supply or the capacitor cannot break state continuity.
regs NVRAM
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Figure 2: Architecture of guarded memory. When
power suddenly fails on-chip dedicated registers are
backed up to off-chip, shadow memory (NVRAM).
Only on-chip components need to be trusted. Hard-
ware attacks against NVRAM, main power supply
or the capacitor cannot break state continuity.
The controller must also guarantee that guarded memory
can be used to store sensitive data in a way that is inacces-
sible to an attacker. This is achieved by implementing an
exclusive access mechanism. At boot time guarded memory
is publicly accessible. The first enclave that requests exclu-
sive access will receive it until the next reboot. From then
on only that enclave can access guarded memory. Access
requests from other enclaves or unprotected memory will be
blocked. When power goes down, exclusive access is lost and
data stored in guarded memory must be considered as being
public.
Persistent Storage.
ICE uses operating system services to access persistent
storage. These services are not trusted: an attacker may
copy, replace and destroy files. To differentiate between the
actual state of a module and states stored on disk, we call
the latter (ICE) cubes whenever ambiguity might arise.
3.2 Guards: Storing Freshness Info
Just as message authentication codes (MACs) can be used
to guarantee message integrity, we will use guards to prove
that a cube is fresh. Guards are 2-tuples:
guardi(n) = (Hash
i(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
guard value
, i︸︷︷︸
guard index
)
where the first element, the guard value represents the hash
value after hashing the base value i times, the guard index.
A guard is incremented by hashing the guard value and
incrementing the index:
guardi(n) = (Hash
i(n), i)
guardi+1(n) = (Hash
i+1(n), i+ 1)
Based on the construction of guards, they possess two
important properties: (1) two guards can be compared based
on the guard index:
(n, i) ≤ (m, j)⇔
{
n = m if i = j
(Hash(n), i+ 1) ≤ (m, j) if i < j
and, (2) an attacker is unable to calculate any preceding
guard as this would imply inverting the hash function.
3.3 ChkPassword: A Running Toy Example
Guaranteeing state-continuity is non-trivial and can only
be accomplished by a module provider taking the required
1 s t a t i c i n t a t t e m p t s l e f t ;
s t a t i c char ∗password ;
3
void INIT ( void ) {
5 State ∗ s t a t e ;
i f ( r e t r i e v e ( &s t a t e ) == UNINITIALIZED) {
7 password = ”d e f a u l t ” ;
a t t e m p t s l e f t = 3 ;
9 } e l s e
r e s t o r e a n d r e s t a r t ( s t a t e ) ;
11 }
13 i n t ENTRY POINT check passwd ( char ∗ guess ) {
State ∗ s t a t e = new State ( ) ;
15
// s t o r e ( input , s t a t e ) tup l e
17 c o l l e c t s t a t e ( s t a t e ) ;
c o l l e c t i n p u t ( s tate , ”CHECK PASSWD” ) ;
19 c o l l e c t i n p u t ( s tate , guess ) ;
s t o r e ( s t a t e ) ;
21
// check passwd
23 i f ( a t t e m p t s l e f t > 0 &&
strcmp ( password , guess ) == 0 ) {
25 a t t e m p t s l e f t = 3 ;
re turn OK;
27 } e l s e {
a t t e m p t s l e f t = max( a t t e m pt s l e f t −1 ,0) ;
29 re turn INCORRECT;
}
31 }
33 i n t ENTRY POINT set passwd ( char ∗oldpwd ,
char ∗newpwd) { . . . }
Listing 1: ChkPassword: A running example
safety precautions. We only provide a library offering state-
continuous storage. To demonstrate the subtle vulnerabili-
ties that need to be resolved, consider as a running toy exam-
ple ChkPassword, a password-checking module displayed in
listing 1. It exposes an interface of two functions: set_passwd
that modifies the user’s password and check_passwd2 that
handles login attempts. To prevent dictionary attacks, Chk-
Password will lock out a user indefinitely after 3 incorrect
attempts. We assume that when the module is created, the
INIT function is called before any service call is handled.
When ChkPassword executes on the platform for the first
time, a default password is selected (line 7), otherwise its
previous state is restored (line 10).
To ensure state continuity, ChkPassword needs to fulfill
three requirements. First, it must protect against subtle
timing attacks. When an attacker is able to infer that the
provided password is incorrect based on timing differences
between a correct and incorrect password3, she may be able
to crash the system before the login attempt could be re-
corded. Ensuring that each execution path takes exactly
the same amount of CPU cycles is hard. Similar to Parno
2Calling ChkPassword from unprotected memory would en-
able an attacker to intercept the provided password before
it reaches the module. Users of ChkPassword should estab-
lish a secure channel from another module before exchanging
sensitive data [3, 37]. Such considerations are out of scope.
3A similar attack exists when a (unique) callback to unpro-
tected memory is made before an undesirable state is stored.
et al. [30], we take a much simpler approach and store the
state with the newly provided input before it is used in any
computation. Hence, ChkPassword stores its current state
(the number of attempts left and the correct password) to-
gether with the provided guess (line 17-20) before checking
the provided password. An unexpected crash while the pass-
word is being verified (i.e., after line 20), will then result in
the current state being restored and execution is restarted;
another attempt is made to check the same provided pass-
word. We assume restore_and_restart restores the cur-
rent state and restarts execution of the last called entry
point (line 10). Alternatively, if the system crashed before
the input could be recorded and thus was never used in any
meaningful computation (i.e., before line 20), the guess can
simply be discarded.
Second, in order to guarantee that re-execution of the
same input on the same state always leads to an identi-
cal result, modules must be deterministic. This implies that
modules must consider all sources of non-determinism (e.g.,
the result of a random number generator) as input and thus
store such data before using it in any computation.
Third, an attacker must not be able to infer any value
from the size of the stored states on disk; modules must
ensure that all cubes are equal in size.
3.4 ICE Libraries
We will provide state-continuous storage in two steps. In
Section 3.4.1 we introduce libice0, a library providing sup-
port at the cost of scarce platform resources for every in-
stance. Then in Section 3.4.2, we present libicen that al-
leviates resource pressure by storing freshness information
in a single, state-continuous module ice0. As all libicen
library instances connect to the same, unique ice0 instance,
a virtually unlimited number of modules is supported.
Both libice0 and libicen provide the same interface:
store(State *) and retrieve(State **). To avoid re-
peated TPM or ice0 accesses, libice0 and libicen keep
a cached copy. In order to distinguish between these copies
and explicitly state where they are stored, we will reference
them similarly to fields of a struct. For example, the en-
cryption and MAC keys stored in the TPM chip will be
referenced as tpm.keys. The variables used by the ICE
algorithm are referenced as ice.keys and so on. Besides
storing keys and the guard we also keep track of the state
of the algorithm using a mode variable. Stored inside the
TPM chip (tpm.mode), this variable indicates whether ICE
was once initiated correctly. In libice0 (ice.mode) this
variable is used to indicate whether ICE was initiated or
recovered since reboot. We assume that when a module is
resurrected after a crash, ice.mode is initialized with value
Clear. As a shorthand, we also assume that setting this
variable takes exclusive access of guarded memory. Listing 2
uses these variables to differentiate between an initial state
being stored and a state being updated. Similarly, tpm.mode
is used to determine whether a state was ever stored.
3.4.1 libice0: State-Cont. Storage for One Module
In order to provide state continuity, we must guarantee
that an attacker is not able to fabricate recorded states
(called cubes) and that no stale cubes can be provided as
being fresh. The former is trivially guaranteed by includ-
ing a message authentication code in each cube (see Fig. 3).
Guaranteeing freshness is more challenging, but as modules
1 void s t o r e ( State ∗ s t a t e ) {
switch ( i c e . mode) {
3 case Clear :
r e turn i n i t s t a t e ( s t a t e ) ;
5 case Act ivated :
re turn updat e s t a t e ( s t a t e ) ;
7 } }
9 i n t r e t r i e v e ( State ∗∗ s t a t e ) {
switch (tpm . mode) {
11 case Clear :
r e turn UNINITIALIZED ;
13 case Act ivated :
∗ s t a t e = r e c o v e r y s t e p ( ) ;
15 re turn RECOVERED;
} }
Listing 2: libice0 relies on tpm.mode and ice.mode
to distinguish between storing an initial state,
updating a stored state and recovery
State guard MACencrypted
Figure 3: Stored states are confidentiality and in-
tegrity protected. Freshness is based on the enclosed
guard.
maintain their state between invocations, we only need to
consider power off and reboot events. Let’s call events dur-
ing such power cycles an execution stream. An execution
stream starts by either storing an initial state of a module
or when the state of a module is recovered after a crash.
It ends when the system crashes or when it is shut down
properly.
To keep track of the fresh cube, we will generate a (base)
guard when the execution stream starts and store it securely
in TPM NVRAM. For every state the module requests stor-
age of in the current execution stream, we will increment the
guard and include it in the generated cube. Using guarded
memory we will ensure that only the guard included in the
last (and thus fresh) cube is leaked at the moment the sys-
tem crashes. As no preceding guards were leaked (and can-
not be calculated), it serves as a pointer to the fresh cube.
Upon recovery, knowledge of the guard4 that is stored in the
provided cube, proves that the cube is fresh.
Creation of an Initial State.
When storage of the initial state of the module is re-
quested, a new base guard and keys are generated (see list-
ing 3). Next, a new cube is constructed and written to disk.
Exclusive access of guarded memory is taken by setting the
ice.mode variable to Activated and the fresh guard is writ-
ten to guarded memory. In case exclusive access cannot be
assigned (i.e., another module already received it), the mod-
ule simply stops its execution. For clarity, such error hand-
ling is not displayed. Finally the keys and guard are stored
in the TPM’s NVRAM and tpm.mode is set to Activated,
committing the start of a new execution stream.
4We must also check that this guard was created during the
last execution stream as a matching guard/cube is found at
the end of every execution stream.
void i n i t s t a t e ( State ∗ s t a t e ) {
2 i c e . guard = gen guard ( ) ;
i c e . keys = gen keys ( ) ;
4 hdd . wr i t e ( new Cube( i c e . guard , i c e . keys ,
s t a t e ) ) ;
i c e . mode = Activated ;
6 gmem. guard = i c e . guard ;
tpm . guard = i c e . guard ;
8 tpm . keys = i c e . keys ;
tpm . mode = Activated ;
10 }
Listing 3: libice0: Storing the initial state
void updat e s t a t e ( State ∗ s t a t e ) {
2 i c e . guard = ++i c e . guard ;
hdd . wr i t e ( new Cube( i c e . guard , i c e . keys ,
s t a t e ) ) ;
4 gmem. guard = i c e . guard ;
}
Listing 4: libice0: Updating a state
Updating a State.
When storage of a new input-state pair is requested in the
same execution stream, the previously used guard and keys
are still stored in libice0’s memory and no TPM accesses
are required. To safely store the input-state pair, a new cube
is created with the subsequent guard and stored on disk (see
listing 4). Finally the step is committed by writing the fresh
guard to guarded memory.
Recovering from a Crash.
Recovering from a crash is more challenging and is achieved
in two steps (see listing 5, error handling is omitted for clar-
ity). First, the last stored cube is read from disk. By veri-
fying three properties its freshness is ensured:
• Validity: Cubes must not have been forged by an at-
tacker. This is ensured by the MAC stored in each
cube and the accompanying key stored securely in the
TPM chip (line 17).
• Correct execution stream: The cube received from the
untrusted OS must have been created during the last
execution stream. At the start of each execution stream
a new base guard is generated and stored in TPM
NVRAM. All guards used during this execution stream
are successors of this base guard. Hence, the cube was
created during the last execution stream iff (line 18):
tpm.guard ≤ cube.guard
• Public guard: libice0 ensures that guarded memory
always contains the same guard as the last (fresh) cube
stored on disk5, and that no preceding guards leak
or can be calculated. Hence, if the guard stored in
guarded memory matches the guard included in the
cube at hand and the two previous properties hold as
well, it is guaranteed that the cube is fresh (line 19).
5There is one exception as writing cubes to disk and updat-
ing guarded memory cannot be executed atomically. This
exception is resolved later in this section.
1 State ∗ r e c o v e r y s t e p ( ) {
Cube cube = hdd . read ( ) ;
3 i f ( i s f r e s h ( &cube ) ) {
State ∗ s t a t e = e x t r a c t ( cube , tpm . keys
) ;
5 i c e . guard = gen guard ( ) ;
i c e . keys = tpm . keys ;
7 hdd . wr i t e ( new Cube( i c e . guard , i c e .
keys , s t a t e ) ) ;
i c e . mode = Activated ;
9 gmem. guard = i c e . guard ;
tpm . guard = i c e . guard ;
11 re turn s t a t e ;
}
13 e l s e abort ( ) ;
}
15
bool i s f r e s h ( Cube ∗cube ) {
17 re turn ( check mac ( cube , tpm . keys ) &&
tpm . guard ≤ cube−>guard &&
19 gmem. guard . va lue == cube−>guard . va lue ) ;
}
21
bool operator≤( Guard g1 , Guard g2 ) {
23 whi le ( g1 . index < g2 . index ) {
g1 . va lue = Hash ( g1 . va lue ) ;
25 ++g1 . index ;
}
27 re turn g1 . va lue == g2 . va lue ;
}
Listing 5: libice0: Recovering from a crash.
In the second step the fresh state is re-stored as part of
a new execution stream: libice0’s variables are restored
from TPM NVRAM, a new base guard is generated, the
fresh state packaged in a new cube and the base guard is
written to guarded and TPM NVRAM memory. To ensure
that after an unexpected crash during the execution of this
step, recovery can be restarted, libice0 must (1) backup
the previous fresh guard before overwriting it in guarded
memory. As this value is public, any persistent storage can
be used (for clarity not displayed in listing 5). (2) The new
base guard is written to TPM NVRAM as the last step.
Let’s reconsider ChkPassword and discuss how crashes are
resolved. Depending on the timing of a crash, we can dif-
ferentiate between three main situations. Fig. 4 displays
them graphically. One, ChkPassword was just created and
the user called set_passwd to change the default password.
This led to the execution of _init_state but the system
crashes before tpm.mode could be set (see listing 3 line 9,
t0 in Fig. 4). When ChkPassword is re-created, it requests
its previous state (listing 1, line 6). As tpm.mode still read
Clear (listing 2 line 3), the module will restart from its de-
fault settings. As no input was ever used, state-continuity
is guaranteed trivially.
Two, the system didn’t crash when the user modified the
module’s default password and now calls check_passwd pro-
viding "attempt1" as password. After libice0 stores a new
cube Cattempt1 on disk and updates guarded memory, the
system crashes while the password is being verified (listing 1
line 23, t1 in Fig. 4). The module is re-created and execution
flow eventually executes _recovery_step (listing 5) As only
a single cube is available containing the leaked guard from
guarded memory (or a successor thereof), only cube Cattempt1
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Figure 4: Graphical overview of the steps taken by a module storing its initial state and taking two steps in
the same execution stream. Depending on the timing of a crash, three distinct situations can occur.
is considered fresh. After returning the stored input-state
tuple in Cattempt1, ChkPassword will restore the attempts_left
and password variables and execution is restarted with input
"attempt1" (listing 1 line 10).
Three, assume that the previous password was incorrect
and the user enters "attempt2" for her second attempt. Af-
ter storing the new cube Cattempt2 on disk, the system crashes
before the incremented guard could be written to guarded
memory (listing 4 line 4, t2 in Fig. 4). This is an interesting
point of failure as both cubes Cattempt1 as Cattempt2 can be
considered fresh6. However, recovery based on either will
preserve state continuity. This is obvious for cube Cattempt2
as this is the latest cube written to disk. Recovery from
Cattempt1, however will purge any record of the login attempt
made using "attempt2". This is also safe as it was never
used in any valuable computation (instructions after list-
ing 1 line 24 were not executed yet). Hence, an attacker is
not able to deduce any valuable information.
3.4.2 libicen: State-Cont. Storage for n Modules
By depending on scarce resources such as TPM NVRAM
and guarded memory, libice0 can in practice only provide
state-continuous storage to a limited number of modules.
libicen will alleviate this strain by using a single, unique
ice0 module to store freshness information on behalf of
other modules. To safely exchange sensitive information be-
tween libicen and the ice0 module, inter-module commu-
nication must guarantee endpoint authentication and confi-
dentiality, integrity and freshness of messages. We will state
this explicitly by passing a module identifier to ice0 calls.
Creation of an initial state.
Similarly to libice0, an initial state of the module is
stored by generating a new guard and cryptographic keys
and writing a new cube to disk (see listing 6). Finally the
6The recovery step as displayed in listing 5, line 19, only
accepts cube Cattempt1 as fresh. However, an attacker in-
crementing the guard stored in guarded memory, will trick
libice0 to accept cube Cattempt2 as being fresh as well.
void i n i t s t e p ( State ∗ s t a t e ) {
2 mod . guard = gen guard ( ) ;
mod . keys = gen keys ( ) ;
4 hdd . wr i t e ( new Cube( mod . guard , mod . keys ,
s t a t e ) ) ;
mod . mode = Activated ;
6 i c e 0 . s t o r e ( mod . id , mod . keys , mod . guard ) ;
}
Listing 6: libicen: Initialization of a new module
1 void updat e s ta t e ( State ∗ s t a t e ) {
++mod . guard ;
3 hdd . wr i t e ( new Cube( mod . guard , mod . keys ,
s t a t e ) ) ;
i c e 0 . s t o r e ( mod . id , mod . guard ) ;
5 }
Listing 7: libicen: Updating a state
ice0 module is requested to (state-continuously) store the
keys and guard.
Updating a state.
To update a state, libicen first writes a new cube to
disk, before the updated fresh guard is stored in ice0 (see
listing 7).
Recovering from a crash.
To recover from a crash, the (presumably) fresh cube is
read from disk (see listing 8). Next, the keys and guard
are requested from the ice0 module. As the fresh guard is
always stored safely in ice0, a cube with a correct MAC
and that contains the fresh guard, must be fresh. Once
the cube’s freshness has been validated, libicen needs to
generate a new guard, create and write a new cube to disk
and store the new guard in ice0 before a new step is taken.
The fact that a new guard is generated may be surprising
1 State ∗ r e c o v e r y s t e p ( ) {
Cube cube = hdd . read ( ) ;
3 i c e 0 . r e t r i e v e ( mod . id , &mod . keys , &mod .
guard )
i f ( i s f r e s h ( &cube ) ) {
5 State ∗ s t a t e = e x t r a c t ( cube . s tate ,
tpm . keys )
7 mod . guard = gen guard ( ) ;
hdd . wr i t e ( new Cube( mod . guard ,
9 mod . keys ,
cube . s t a t e ) ) ;
11 mod . s t a t e = Activated ;
i c e 0 . s t o r e (mod . id , mod . keys , mod . guard )
13 re turn s t a t e ;
}
15 e l s e abort ( ) ;
}
17
bool i s f r e s h ( Cube ∗cube ) {
19 re turn check mac ( cube , mod . keys ) &&
mod . guard . va lue == cube . guard . va lue ;
21 }
Listing 8: libicen: Recovering from a crash
since libicen’s guards never leak. But if this security mea-
sure is omitted, state continuity cannot be guaranteed. Let’s
reconsider ChkPassword and show that if no new guards are
created upon recovery, an attacker can create (fresh) cubes
for every password in a dictionary attack and later tests
them one by one. To explain the first step, recall that mod-
ules are required to first store input-state tuples before pro-
cessing input. This enables an attacker to input a password,
store the resulting cube on disk and then crash the system
before the input is committed; the system keeps crashing be-
fore writing the new guard to guarded memory (listing 7 line
4). These instructions are repeated for every password in the
dictionary. In the second step of the attack, the module is
finally allowed to check a password. If it is incorrect, the
attacker crashes the system. Upon recovery the fresh cube
is requested from disk, but as all cubes contain the same
guard value, all are considered fresh and another guess can
be made. This example shows that seemingly obvious state-
continuous algorithms may be susceptible to subtle bugs and
should be formally verified.
4. IMPLEMENTATIONS
To be feasible in practice, any system providing state-
continuous storage needs to be (1) small enough to allow
formal verification (2) operate seamlessly with legacy soft-
ware (3) incur a low performance overhead and (4) not wear
out TPM NVRAM. ICE is able to meet all these conditions,
but depending on hardware support available, it is able to
withstand different levels of hardware attacks. We describe
implementations on platforms ranging from existing, com-
modity hardware platforms to distant future architectures.
4.1 ICE on Commodity Hardware
Given that SGX-enabled platforms will only become avail-
able in the near future, we implemented7 a prototype of ICE
on a commodity platform. A hypervisor-based protected-
7Our research prototype is available at https://distrinet.
cs.kuleuven.be/software/sce/
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Figure 5: ICE provides state-continuity guarantees
to isolated modules used by many state-of-the-art
security architectures on commodity hardware
module architecture provided support for module isolation
and we used CMOS memory as guarded memory. Obvi-
ously, since the hypervisor cannot prevent isolated modules
to be evicted from the CPU cache to main memory in plain-
text and CMOS memory is an easy attack vector, this im-
plementation cannot protect against sophisticated hardware
attacks.
4.1.1 Architecture
We opted to implement our prototype on top of Fides [37],
a pre-existing PMA architecture. Its support for secure com-
munication between modules enables an elegant implemen-
tation of libicen, where ice0 can be implemented as a pro-
tected module. Alternatively, other protected-module ar-
chitectures could implement similar secure communication
primitives, or include ice0 as part of the security platform.
Fides’ architecture with trusted/untrusted components are
displayed in Fig. 5.
While any non-volatile memory can serve as an alterna-
tive, CMOS memory is an interesting candidate for guarded
memory. As it stores wall-clock time, it is updated every
second and it must support a large number of write opera-
tions over its entire lifespan. Second, as it does not require
a special communication protocol, it can be accessed easily
and without much overhead. Being only accessible through
direct I/O, it can also be isolated easily by hardware virtu-
alization support.
4.1.2 Prototype Implementation
We added support to Fides for isolating and accessing
CMOS memory. Using virtualization support to isolate pro-
grammed I/O, only 21 lines of code (LOC) had to be added
to the hypervisor. Another 61 LOCs were required to imple-
ment system calls to access CMOS memory from the mod-
ule. This totals the size of the hypervisor to 9,492 LOCs.
While Fides at this moment does not support TPM chip ac-
cesses, we estimate, based on the Flicker [25] source code8,
that this straightforward effort would require an addition of
less than 2,000 LOCs. As ICE only accesses the TPM at
boot time, this does not impact performance.
While CMOS memory can be read/write accessed by the
hypervisor, BIOS support for real-world implementations is
required to allocate memory and exclude the area from its
checksum to avoid that values written to CMOS memory are
cleared on reboot. In practice, we must also ensure that the
guard stored in CMOS memory is not lost when the system
crashes while the previous guard is being overwritten. This
8https://sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/group/flicker.html
libice0 libicen
asm C asm C
ICE 0 372 0 341
SHA-512 0 371 0 371
AES-NI 1,566 176 1,566 176
Total 1,566 919 1,566 888
Table 1: Breakdown of libice0 and libicen.
can be solved by implementing a two-phase commit protocol
where first a new guard is written before overwriting the
previous one. In the event of an unexpected crash, the old
guard may not have been overwritten yet and both guards
leak to an attacker. However, this does not impact security
as such an event is similar to an unexpected loss of power
before the guard is updated; An attacker can easily calculate
the new guard based on the one leaked. This situation is
covered by the formal, machine-checked proof.
As available space in CMOS memory is BIOS-specific,
some systems may have insufficient space to store two hash
values. There are two options (1) they may use an alter-
native hash function with a smaller hash value [6] or (2)
only partially store the hash value (e.g. the 2 least signifi-
cant bytes). As the value is only compared to the expected
value, only the operator<= function of libice0 needs to
be trivially modified (listing 5, line 27). To prevent an at-
tacker from guessing a correct value, the number of recov-
ery attempts can be tracked by storing a counter in TPM
NVRAM. This counter can be decremented before the pro-
vided guess is tested, preventing a crash attack. Full support
for state continuity is in this case not required as the chances
of repeated crashes during recovery are expected to be low
in practice and thus losing a few recovery attempts is not an
issue. To conservatively evaluate performance for a strong
security implementation, we used the SHA-512 hash algo-
rithm to create guard values. In Section 6 we will show that
writing to CMOS is 5x more time consuming than libice0’s
computations. Hence, writing less data to CMOS will have
a positive impact on performance.
To implement libice0 and libicen, we used the polarssl9
library to calculate SHA-512 hash values and the Intel AES-
NI reference implementation to take advantage of AES hard-
ware support. This totals to 2,485 LOCs and 2,454 LOCs
for libice0 and libicen respectively (table 1).
4.2 SGX-Based Implementation
By relying on SGX’ guarantees that enclaves never leave
the CPU package in plaintext, ICE can also withstand physi-
cal attacks but some security measures must be taken. First,
dedicated hardware support for guarded memory is required.
As proposed in Section 3.1, dedicated registers can be added
to the CPU storing the fresh guard while the system is pow-
ered on. When power is suddenly lost, the content of these
registers can be backed up to non-volatile memory using a
small capacitor. Non-volatile memory nor the capacitor are
security sensitive. Only dedicated registers need to be pro-
tected from inspection by a (hardware) attacker but as they
are included in the CPU package, they share the same pro-
tection as enclaves residing in one of the CPU’s caches. To
prevent that the contents of these dedicated registers can be
accessed by a (software-level) attacker, we propose a sim-
9http://polarssl.org/
ple permission mechanism; the first enclave that requested
access is granted it exclusively. Attempts to access these
registers from any other locations will be prevented.
Second, we must guarantee that the base guard stored in
TPM NVRAM at the beginning of every execution stream,
will not leak to an attacker. This can be established by
setting up a secure channel from the ice0 module to the
TPM chip [44]. Authentication data can be sealed to the
ice0 module using SGX seal functionality [3, 17].
Third, in Section 3.4.2 we assumed that modules can eas-
ily and safely interact with one another. Fides supports such
interaction explicitly by allowing modules to be authenti-
cated and called from other modules. Unfortunately SGX
enclaves cannot be called from other enclaves [17]. While
this issue could be resolved with another hardware modifi-
cation, it is not required. Using local attestation [3], enclaves
can authenticate each other and set up a secure channel. As
messages need to be passed in unprotected memory, they
need to be confidentiality and integrity protected. A packet
number must also be included to prevent replay attacks.
4.3 Distant Future Architectures
Given that TPM chips are already widely deployed, makes
them a logical location to store freshness information and
cryptographic keys over execution streams. Unfortunately,
hardware attacks against the chip have been presented [36,
41, 47]. Moreover, the TPM chip is overly complex for our
use case. This increases the risk of software vulnerabilities
in the chip. We propose hardware replacements that pro-
vide stronger protection against physical attacks with only
minimal hardware support.
To prevent ICE’s cryptographic keys to leak to a hardware
attacker launching offline attacks, we can replace it with a
physically uncloneable function (PUF) [29]. PUFs are based
on tiny variations in the manufacturing process of every indi-
vidual hardware chip. This guarantees that PUFs are unique
and are hard to copy. It has been shown that PUFs can be
used to extract cryptographic keys. Their primary advan-
tages over non-volatile memory, are (1) that they can only
be read while they are powered and (2) physical temper-
ing will destroy the PUF’s intrinsic data. This makes them
much more resilient against hardware attacks.
If we closely examine the libice0 algorithm, we can ob-
serve that the base value of guards is always randomly se-
lected. This enables it to be replaced by a reconfigurable
PUF (rPUF) [20]. Similar to PUFs, rPUFs can be used
to safely store random bits of data from an offline hard-
ware attacker. But rPUFs have the additional functionality
that they can be reconfigured; upon instruction the intrin-
sic secret data can be randomly modified. Once a rPUF
has been reconfigured, it can never be reverted. Unfortu-
nately, rPUFs still are a theoretical concept. Logical rPUFs
have been proposed [18], where a PUF is combined with the
contents of a non-volatile register. Only when the register
contents is unchanged, will the logical rPUF return the same
result. Upon reconfiguration, the register content is hashed
and cannot be reverted. In contrast to “real” rPUFs, secu-
rity sensitive information is still present after power-off and
may be susceptible to attack.
While PUFs and rPUFs protect against a hardware at-
tacker, we must ensure that malicious software on the plat-
form cannot access these hardware primitives. This can be
guaranteed by loading the ice0 module on power-on [12] in
memory and only allowing PUF/rPUF accesses from that
memory region. In case the PUF/rPUF are implemented on
a separate chip, a secure channel to the CPU needs to be
established as well.
5. SECURITY EVALUATION
Since state-continuous algorithms must deal with sudden
system crashes at any point in time, they are prone to subtle
vulnerabilities. To guarantee ICE is indeed safe against a
powerful attacker, we developed formal proofs of correctness.
5.1 Safety Properties
One of the properties that a safe state-continuous algo-
rithm must guarantee, is that once a module starts com-
puting with user-provided input, it must complete the ini-
tiated step or never advance at all. Provided input that
was not yet used in any computation, however, may simply
be discarded. To prove libice0’s safety, we first consider
deterministic modules that only take their last state as in-
put and later extend the proof to modules that also take
non-deterministic (user) input. Finally we formally prove
libicen’s security guarantees.
Safety of libice0 in the event of deterministic modules
was proven by a machine-checked proof10 with the Coq proof
assistant [5]. The proof required 118 definitions, 201 lemmas
and totals 37,726 lines. For non-deterministic modules and
libicen, we created formal proofs, but leave machine-checks
as future work.
5.1.1 Model
We modeled the state of a concrete system as a 7-tuple
(T, N, I, H, P, t, g) where record T holds the contents of the
TPM’s secure storage. To be able to model cryptographi-
cally secure random numbers, a monotonic counter is also
kept in T. N keeps the content of the guarded non-volatile
memory. Whether it can be accessed by an attacker depends
on the mode of the countermeasure that is stored in the I
record together with the current guard, cryptographic key
and the current state of the module. H models the hard disk
drive of the machine and stores the cubes. P models all pub-
lic data, including cubes that were ever stored on disk and
leaked guards from guarded memory. The algorithm itself
is represented as a small program (see listing 9) that keeps
advancing a module ϕ and is written as a term t. Finally a
ghost element g tracks the last executed state and facilitates
checking the proof.
Based on the state space S of these 7-tuples, we built a
state machine with a step relation SM ⊆ S ×S where every
step is either a program step or an attack step. A program
step takes one evaluation step on term t. To ensure that our
proof also holds in practice, we ensured that all instructions
are feasible on commodity systems. For example, we do not
consider that the TPM chip and guarded memory can be
accessed simultaneously. We modeled the module requiring
state continuity as a deterministic function ϕ. Whenever
the module is executed with input state i, this argument is
copied to ghost element g.
In an attack step an attacker is able to perform 4 opera-
tions:
10The correctness proof is publicly available at https://
distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/software/sce/
1 void ice program ( void ) {
whi le ( t rue ) {
3 switch ( i c e . mode , tpm . mode) {
case ( Activated , ) :
5 normal step ( ) ;
break ;
7 case ( Clear , Clear ) :
i n i t s t e p ( ) ;
9 break ;
case ( Clear , Act ivated ) :
11 r e co v e r y s t e p ( ) ;
break ;
13 } } }
Listing 9: To prove libice0’s correctness, we created
a small application that will keep advancing a
module
• Crash the system: The system may crash at any point.
This will (1) lift the protection of guarded memory
and its contents becomes public knowledge. (2) I (i.e.
libice0’s memory area) is cleared and does not leak.
(3) libice0 is restarted (term t is set to its initial
value).
• Modify HDD: The contents of the hard disk drive may
be modified by an attacker at any time. Cubes can
be deleted, restored from public information in P, or
cubes can be crafted by an attacker using publicly
known cryptographic keys in P.
• Modify guarded memory: When the protection of guarded
memory is down, an attacker is able to modify its con-
tents and set it to any publicly derivable guard value.
A guard g′ = (v′, i′) is publicly derivable from guard
g = (v, i) when its guard value v′ can be computed
from v:
∃n ∈ N, v′ = Hashn(v)
The guard index is not considered and can be chosen
arbitrarily.
• Use random number: At any time an attacker is able
to request a new random number from the TPM chip.
5.1.2 libice0’s State-Continuity Guarantees
To prove libice0’s correctness, we differentiate between
modules that take non-deterministic input and modules that
only operate on their last state.
libice0: State Continuity of Deterministic Modules.
Before we discuss the proof in more detail, we first in-
troduce some definitions. We define R∗ as the reflexive-
transitive closure of a state relation R i.e. R∗ = ∪n∈NRn.
The image R(X) of a set X under a relation R is defined
as R(X) = {s′|∃s ∈ X.(s, s′) ∈ R}. We also define the
composition P ;R of a state predicate P and a state rela-
tion R as P ;R = (P × S) ∩ R. Similarly, we define R;P as
R;P = R ∩ (S × P )
To prove state continuity we use rely-guarantee reasoning
and reason about reset, interference and program steps sep-
arately. We say a submachine with step relation S is safe
under a precondition P , a rely condition R, and a guaran-
tee condition G, denoted safe(P,R,G, S), if, when starting
from a state that satisfies the precondition, all steps by the
submachine satisfy the guarantee condition, assuming that
all steps by the environment satisfy the rely condition:
safe(P,R,G, S) = (S ∪R)∗(P );S ⊆ G
Finally we define SM as a step relation SM ⊆ S × S where
each step is either a program step or an attacker step.
Theorem 1 (libice0’s deterministic safety). We wish
to prove the following:
safe({s0}, Id, A, SM )
where the precondition allows just the initial state s0, the
rely condition is the identity relation (since there is no envi-
ronment), and the guarantee condition is the set of allowed
steps. A step is allowed when libice0 either calls ϕ with its
last output or it is a stutter step where ϕ is not called or it
re-executes with the last input:
A = {(s, s′) ∈ SM |g(s′) = g(s) ∨ g(s′) = ϕ(g(s))}
First we separate reset steps from non-reset steps: SM =
SReset∪SNonreset. We can do so using the following inference
rule:
Reset
S = SReset ∪ SNonreset IReset;R ⊆ R; IReset
safe(QReset, R, (G; IReset), SNonreset) P ⊆ QReset
IReset;SReset ⊆ G;QReset QReset ⊆ IReset
safe(P,R,G, S)
Here, the reset postcondition QReset is a state predicate that
always holds immediately after a reset. It must also hold
initially (P ⊆ QReset). The reset invariant IReset is a state
predicate that holds in every reachable state, i.e. it is pre-
served by the reset steps as well as the non-reset steps. It
follows that a reset step always starts in a state that satisfies
the reset invariant. The reset postcondition must imply the
reset invariant.
We can further categorize the non-reset steps SNonreset
into program steps SProg and interference steps SItf. During
an interference step, an attacker may, for example, modify
the contents of the hard disk, or of guarded memory when its
protection is not enabled. Again, we wish to reason about
these steps separately. We can do so using the following
inference rule:
Interference
S = SProg ∪ SItf I;SItf ⊆ G; I ∩GItf
I;R ⊆ R; I P ⊆ I
safe(P,R ∪GItf, G; I, SProg)
safe(P,R,G, S)
Here, a global invariant I is established by the precondi-
tion P and maintained by all steps. Furthermore, interfer-
ence steps satisfy an interference guarantee Gitf. Program
steps are verified under a rely that is the union of the global
rely and the interference guarantee.
Now that we have isolated the program steps, we wish to
perform simple forward reasoning to verify these. For this
purpose, we define the following auxiliary safety judgment:
safe’(s,R,G, S)0 =true
safe’(s,R,G, S)n+1 =∀s′ ∈ R(s).∀s′′ ∈ S(s′).
(s′, s′′) ∈ G ∧ safe’n(s′′, R,G, S)
We have the following inference rule:
Program
Id ⊆ R′ R ⊆ R′ R′;R′ ⊆ R′
∀n ∈ N, s ∈ P . safe’n(s,R′, G, S)
safe(P,R,G, S)
Note that safe’ assumes that the environment performs a
single R′ step before every program step. Therefore, R′
must subsume the reflexive-transitive closure of R. This is
expressed by the first three premises of the inference rule.
If the program contains a loop, such as the while-loop in
libice0’s main function (see listing 9), we can verify it as
follows:
Loop
s ∈ I
∀m ∈ N, (∀k < m, s′ ∈ I . safe′k(s′, R,G, S))
⇒ ∀s′ ∈ I . safe′m(s′, R,G, S)
safe’n(s,R,G, S)
Using loop invariant I we prove that, if the program is safe
starting from I for less than m steps, then it is safe starting
from I for m steps. This is a classical inductive proof.
The invariants that we had to come up with were reason-
ably big and contained a lot of information relating to how
we modeled the secure random number generator. For ex-
ample, we had to prove for every step that guards that were
leaked all were created using the TPM’s SRNG. This en-
sured that newly generated guards were not yet in the pub-
lic domain. More interesting was the cube invariant stating
that any cube in the public domain and that is seen by the
algorithm as fresh, contains as module state either the ghost
state g or the result of ϕ(g). This led to a case split of the
normal step, where a new state is stored that depends on the
previous round of libice0’s main function (see listing 9) .
Either the algorithm was initialized or took a normal step
in the previous round, or has recovered from a crash. In the
former case, fresh public cubes contain the last state (and
equal the libice0’s internal memory) that was given to ϕ
and the algorithm will advance the module to a new state.
Alternatively, the last round was a recovery step in which
case libice0 may execute a stutter step, depending on when
exactly the system was reset: before or after a new cube was
written to disk and the step committed by writing the suc-
cessor guard to guarded memory. In case the cube was not
yet stored, fresh cubes contain the same state as is stored in
the ghost state g. Also note that when the system was reset
after the cube was written to disk but before the step was
committed, both options are feasible since the contents of
guarded memory is now publicly accessible and an attacker
could complete the step.
libice0: State-Continuity of Non-Deterministic Mod-
ules.
In the previous paragraph we proved state continuity for
deterministic modules. Using an alternative formulation,
we proved that when an application step ϕ is taken from
application state a in machine state s and followed by any
number of attack steps, then for the next application step it
follows that either a new step was taken (a′ = ϕ(a)) or the
module re-executed the last step (a′ = a):
s
ϕ(a)−−−→ s′ att−−→∗ s′′ ϕ(a
′)−−−→ s′′′ ⇒ a′ = a ∨ a′ = ϕ(a)
Based on this theorem we can easily extend our model
to allow non-deterministic inputs to the module. Given a
module that operates on its previous state and (user) input,
we prove that once it commits to an input, it will either use
that input to advance its state or it will never advance (e.g.,
because the attacker crashes the system and erases the fresh
cube).
Theorem 2 (libice0’s non-deterministic safety).
More formally, consider a module ϕ that accepts input i on
application state a and machine state s followed by any num-
ber of attack steps. When the module takes another step, it
will either advance to the next state, or it will re-execute its
previous step with the same input:
s
ϕ(a,i)−−−−→ s′ att−→∗ s′′ ϕ(a
′,i′)−−−−−→ s′′′
⇒ a′ = a ∧ i′ = i ∨ a′ = ϕ(a, i) (i′ ∈ I)
where I is the set of possible input values.
The core principle of libice0’s deterministic state-continuity
proof is that we know that a state update is committed when
we successfully incremented the guard in guarded memory.
At that point we can feed module ϕ other input. We use
this knowledge to partition the non-deterministic module ϕ
as ϕ = ϕi ◦ϕc where ϕi requests input from the user and ϕc
deterministically computes a new state with the input state.
By requesting the user’s input after a computation step and
storing it in a new state, only two possibilities arise. One
possibility is that the system crashes after the result of ϕi
was committed. In that case the input is stored and will be
provided to ϕ in the next invocation where ϕc first computes
the result. The other possibility is that the state was not
committed. In that case ϕc will recompute the last state and
request the user again for input. This does not violate state
continuity since the input value is not used in any computa-
tion of the module. Hence, no information about the result
of ϕc can leak to an attacker.
5.1.3 libicen’s State-Continuity Guarantees
While libice0 only provides state-continuity properties
for a single module, libicen supports a virtually unlimited
number of modules. As we did for libice0 we will focus on
security guarantees for deterministic modules. Support for
non-determinism can be provided in a similar fashion as was
explained in the previous paragraph.
Theorem 3 (libicen’s safety). Given a determinis-
tic module ϕ, we will argue that libicen ensures state con-
tinuity: ϕ will only re-execute the last step or take a new
step. More formally we wish to prove:
safe({s0}, Id, A, S′M )
Where we define S′M as a step relation S
′
M ⊆ S × S where
each step is either a program step of libicen or an attacker
step. For s0, Id and A, we use the same definitions as
earlier.
In order to prove libicen’s correctness, we could take
the same approach as we did for libice0. Given the close
similarity between libice0 and libicen, however, we could
also use the proof of libice0 and reason that the modifica-
tions of libicen do not affect state continuity. We will take
this approach using three consecutive transformation steps
α, β, γ and prove that each transformation preserves state
continuity:
S α−→ S1 β−→ S2 γ−→ Sn
First consider transformation α that transforms a state S
of libice0 into a state S1 where TPM NVRAM is used
instead of guarded memory. It is obvious that this does
not affect the security guarantees of libice0 since contents
of this memory will never leak to an attacker. Thus the
attacker grows weaker instead of stronger.
After the α transformation, two guards are stored in the
TPM’s NVRAM: the base guard (n, 0) and a guard (Hashi(n), i)
used to determine which cube is fresh. Since neither of them
can be modified by an attacker and the latter is always a suc-
cessor of the former, the base guard can be omitted. The
second transformation β will remove the base guard and
modify the code of the recovery step. Since all changes hap-
pen within the module’s memory area which cannot be in-
fluenced by an attacker in any new way, modifications of
these instructions do not affect state continuity.
Finally consider an abstraction function γ that abstracts
states S2 in states Sn where all interactions with the TPM’s
NVRAM are replaced with a call to an libice0 module.
Hence, we can rely on libice0 to ensure integrity, confi-
dentiality and state continuity of the stored data. It is also
obvious that combining multiple steps into a single atomic
step does not affect state continuity.
5.2 Liveness Properties
Given our strong attacker model, it is infeasible that any
state-continuity algorithm on commodity hardware is able
to guarantee that a module is always able to advance. An
attacker could, for example, always delete the fresh cube.
Such situations could be resolved in ICE by re-executing
the initial step, at the cost of losing all previously stored
states.
We do however wish to guarantee that progress can always
be made in the event of benign events, such as a sudden loss
of power during any step in the execution of the algorithm.
libice0’s liveness properties.
To guarantee liveness under benign events, libice0 needs
to be able to recover from a crash during every step of its
execution. An important distinction can be made based
on the value of the tpm.mode field. This value indicates
whether the algorithm has been initialized correctly. A crash
before this value is set, will result in a re-execution of the
initialization step. After setting this value, all crashes will
result in the execution of the recovery step. To ensure that
the initialization step may be re-executed in the event of a
sudden crash, the tpm.mode value is set last.
After initialization we may update the state or we have
to recover the fresh state. In the former case we make
sure to first store the cube before we update the content
of guarded memory. Recovery of a state is more challenging
since we have to modify the guards in both guarded and
TPM NVRAM memory. After creating a new cube with
the module’s fresh state and storing it on disk, we enable
protection of guarded memory and write the new guard to
it before we update TPM NVRAM memory. This has an
important consequence: in case the system crashes before
the recovery step is completed, the old guard may already
have been overwritten. This would prevent the re-execution
of the recovery step. Therefore we require that a backup of
this guard is stored on disk before the recovery step is called.
libicen’s liveness properties.
Ensuring liveness of libicen is straightforward since we
only have to deal with two non-volatile data objects: cubes
and calls to libice0. For obvious reasons we ensure to first
store new cubes on disk. The libice0 algorithm guarantees
that its modifications are done atomically and are always
retrievable.
6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of our proto-
type implementation. To compare the performance impact
of a solid state drive (SSD) against a rotating hard drive
(HDD), we used two machines with comparable hardware.
The first machine, a Dell Latitude E6510, a mid-end con-
sumer laptop, is equipped with an Intel Core i5 560M pro-
cessor running at 2.67 GHz and 4 GiB of RAM. It is also
equipped with a magnetic hard disk (HDD), a Broadcom
TPMv1.2 chip and CMOS memory. The second testing lap-
top is a Dell Latitude E6520, has an Intel Core i5-2520M
CPU running at 2.50GHz and is equipped with an SSD.
Hardware Benchmarks.
To better understand the performance cost of ICE com-
pared to TPM operations, we performed 4 benchmarks on
the Latitude E6510: read/write accessing TPM NVRAM,
extending PCR registers and generating random numbers.
To perform these tests, we developed small TPM appli-
cations using the TrouSerS11 open-source software stack.
We also modified the tpm tis driver to keep timing mea-
surements. Each test was run 100 times and transferred
128 bytes to/from the TPM. Figure 6 displays the median
time for each test graphically. All operations take a sig-
nificant amount of time to complete. Especially writing to
TPM NVRAM takes 4x longer than reading from it. Re-
lated work shows similar results for TPM chips from other
vendors [30].
We also performed a similar benchmark on CMOS mem-
ory. We performed 10,000 one-byte write operations and
measured the time using the rdtscp instruction. Writing to
CMOS takes about 3µs/byte, significantly faster than writ-
ing to TPM NVRAM. We attribute this difference to the
fact that CMOS memory is connected to the SPI-bus [16]
and does not require a heavy communication protocol as
does the LPC-connected TPM chip.
Finally, we measured the median time of writing 10,000
128 bytes files to both HDD and SSD disks. As Figure 6
shows, accessing the SSD disk is 5.4 times faster than writing
to TPM NVRAM. Writing to a magnetic disk is more costly.
Microbenchmarks.
To measure the performance of both libice0 and libi-
cen libraries, we implemented two modules. The first mod-
ule implements a password verification function and lim-
its the number of attempts that can be made before the
user is locked out indefinitely. The benchmark provided
this module with 10,000 wrong password guesses and mea-
sured the median time per guess. Measurements show (see
Table 2) that for a single step only 0.06ms (0.43%) were
11http://trousers.sourceforge.net/
Figure 6: Microbenchmarks of various TPM oper-
ations show a significant difference in performance
cost of CMOS and disk accesses. Where applicable,
128 bytes were transferred.
spent on computation when the module was linked with
the libice0 library. When we used libicen’s services, two
cubes need to be created and computation time increased to
0.13ms (0.71%). To securely write guards to CMOS mem-
ory, 0.33ms were spent (2.17% and 1.82% for libice0 and
libicen resp.). This shows a much higher cost to write
guards to CMOS compared to calculation time. But most
of the time was spent committing cubes to solid state disk
(97.40% and 97.47% for libice0 and libicen resp.). libi-
cen does not spend twice the amount of time writing cubes
to disk. Cubes only need to be committed before a guard
is incremented. Hence, libicen’s cubes can be stored tem-
porarily in memory and transferred to disk together with
ice0’s new cube without modifying the algorithm (see list-
ing 7, lines 3-4), reducing disk access times.
While most TPM chips NVRAM area is limited to 1,280
bytes [30], it could be used to provide (state-continuous)
storage to a single module to avoid disk overhead. To show
that such a module would still benefit from ICE, we imple-
mented a second benchmark called Noop. It does not per-
form any computation but only stores a state of 1,280 bytes.
As expected given the performance of SHA-512 and Intel’s
AES hardware support, the increase in computation cost is
negligibly with only 0.01ms. As cubes are still smaller than
disk sectors, costs of disk accesses are comparable to the
Password benchmark. This totals the cost of storing new
data in Noop at 15.05ms to 17.65ms for libice0 and libi-
cen resp,˙ significantly faster than 82.18ms to access TPM
NVRAM. Finally we performed these tests on the Lati-
tude E6510 which is equipped with a magnetic HDD. As
expected, the cost of writing cubes to disk increased sig-
nificantly and now accounts for 99.63%-99.74%. For both
benchmarks libicen consistently takes more time writing
cubes to disk than libice0. We attribute this behavior to
the way we implemented its write function: merging ice0’s
and libicen’s cubes takes us 3 write system calls before
system buffers are flushed.
Expected Impact of Dedicated Hardware.
These benchmarks show that only up to 0.14% of time
is spent on computation. With dedicated hardware perfor-
mance can be increased significantly.
Writing guards to CMOS memory is about 2.4 times more
costly than computation and takes up to 0.31% of the time
in case of a revolving HDD and up to 2.17% on our SSD
Password Noop
SSD (in ms) -lice0 -licen -lice0 -licen
computation 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.14
writing guard 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
writing cubes 14.61 17.42 14.65 17.19
total 15.00 17.87 15.05 17.65
HDD (in ms) -lice0 -licen -lice0 -licen
computation 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.13
writing guard 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
writing cubes 112.80 183.23 111.54 183.83
total 113.21 183.71 111.96 184.31
Table 2: Microbenchmarks for libice0 and libicen
testing platform. Hardware support for guarded memory,
as described in detail in Section 3.1, would reduce overhead
of this operation to almost zero.
But committing cubes to disk forms the real bottleneck,
requiring up to 97.47% (for SSD) to 99.74% (for HDD) of
the time. Recently Viking Technology [43] and Micron Tech-
nology [42] announced that they will ship capacitor-backed
RAM to market. Operating similar to guarded memory,
these hardware components contain fast, volatile memory
that is written to flash memory when power is suddenly lost.
Adding these hardware components to our system would
eliminate disk access completely.
In summary, benchmarks show that our prototype im-
plementation on commodity hardware already outperforms
TPM NVRAM write operations by almost 5 times. Adding
dedicated hardware support for guarded memory and capa-
citor-backed RAM, may even enable state updates 587 times
faster than TPM NVRAM accesses!
7. IMPLICATIONSTOWARDSHARDWARE
SECURITY MODULES
The TPM chip does not allow software modules to be exe-
cuted within its protected boundaries. Instead, it is shipped
with all supported security primitives stored in dedicated
memory. This results in a number of drawbacks. First,
as more resources are required, power usage and hardware
costs increase. To minimize the costs of the PC platform,
the TPM is equipped with a slow operating processor and
limited NVRAM. Other specifications have been developed
for various platforms such as the Mobile Trusted Module
(MTM) for mobile devices. Unfortunately power and eco-
nomic constraints still form an obstacle for low-end applica-
tions such as sensor networks. Second, it increases the possi-
bility of software vulnerabilities in the TPM chip. Some ven-
dors already struggle with its complexity [32] and as func-
tionality is added, the specification may become even more
complex.
Instead of using a separate chip, recent research shows
that strong security guarantees can also be provided when
modules execute on the same processor as untrusted, legacy
software. Agten et al. [2] describe a fully abstract com-
pilation scheme and proof that modules at machine code
level can only be attacked iff vulnerabilities also exist at
source code level. Furthermore, Noorman et al. [27] apply
minimal hardware modifications to implement a protected-
module architecture on a low-end processor.
ICE shows that with little additional hardware support,
various security primitives can be implemented as protected
modules. This has several benefits: (1) By executing pro-
tected modules on the same processor as legacy software,
overall power consumption and economic cost is reduced,
enabling security measures to be ported to low-end devices
(2) Software primitives can be added and updated after the
chip was manufactured or deployed. (3) Hardware optimiza-
tions will increase performance of the overall chip, protected
modules and untrusted software alike. (4) The overall com-
plexity of the system is reduced. We believe that these ad-
vantages can affect future versions or revisions of hardware
security modules, such as the TPM chip and the security of
low-end devices in general.
8. RELATEDWORK
Most research prototypes do not consider state continuity,
leaving them vulnerable to attack. Others propose special-
purpose solutions without addressing resource constraints.
We divide these research results in four categories: results
proposing hardware modifications, results that isolate per-
sistent storage, module-isolation architectures that only re-
quire a minimum TCB and special-purpose applications.
Hardware Modifications.
XOM [23] protects against an attacker that is able to
snoop buses and modify memory by encrypting data and
code before it is sent to memory. While it makes it signifi-
cantly more difficult to successfully attack the system, Suh
et al. [39] argue correctly that it is vulnerable to a mem-
ory replay attack where stale memory pages are returned to
the processor. Their Aegis architecture mitigates this replay
attack by storing hash trees of memory pages in a secure lo-
cation. When a memory page is loaded into the processor’s
cache, its freshness is checked by recalculating and compar-
ing the hash values. Subsequent research results also defend
against replay attacks [8, 17,46].
Memory replay attacks differ from rollback attacks in that
memory contents is replayed while the system is up and run-
ning. This enables much easier security measures.
Schellekens et al. [34] propose an embedded-systems ar-
chitecture to store a trusted module’s persistent state in
invasive-attack-resistent, non-volatile memory. Their solu-
tion implements a light-weight authenticated channel be-
tween the trusted module and non-volatile memory. Fresh-
ness of the stored data is guaranteed per read/write instruc-
tion and based on a monotonic counter. As their approach
assumes that write instructions to non-volatile memory and
increments of the monotonic counter are atomic, unexpected
loss of power enables a rollback attack. We believe that their
approach can be fixed by keeping a log of instructions in se-
cure non-volatile memory that need to be completed in case
power suddenly fails. On higher-end systems however, only
the TPM NVRAM can be used for such purposes and would
lead to significant performance overhead. ICE eliminates the
TPM chip on the performance critical path altogether.
Research Systems Isolating Persistent Storage.
Many architectures rely on a large TCB that includes iso-
lation of persistent storage [13, 35, 40]. In such cases pro-
tection against rollback attacks are trivial: modules/pro-
grams can overwrite their state on disk. In practice how-
ever, software vulnerabilities in their TCB may be exploited
and state-continuity support is hard to guarantee. These
systems are also not able to defend against disk clone at-
tacks. In contrast, ICE provides strong guarantees while
only relying on a very limited TCB.
Protected-Module Architectures.
In recent years many security architectures have been pro-
posed that attempt to minimize the TCB by only providing
strong isolation guarantees of modules [4, 17, 24, 25, 33, 37].
Persistent storage can only be accessed via services provided
by the untrusted legacy operating system. None of them ad-
dress the issue of state continuity.
Many of these systems can be adapted to use the state-
continuity approach presented by Parno et al. [30]. This
seminal work called Memoir, is to the best of our knowl-
edge the first and only work that addresses the issue of
state continuity in protected-module architectures. Based
on Flicker [25], Memoir uses TPM NVRAM to store fresh-
ness information upon every state update. This significantly
limits the applicability of their solution as NVRAM is slow
and only required to support up to 100K writes. The au-
thors acknowledge this constrained and propose two solu-
tions: (1) adding capacitor-backed RAM to the TPM chip
and (2) Memoir-Opt, an alternative approach that stores
freshness information in (volatile) TPM PCR registers that
are written to NVRAM when power is lost unexpectedly.
Both solutions rely on an uninterruptible power source to
safely store freshness when power suddenly fails. Failure
in this mechanism can lead to a rollback attack. ICE, in
contrast, is a passive state-continuity system that does not
rely on an uninterruptible power source to guarantee secu-
rity; detaching the capacitor would only prevent stateful
modules from recovering their state but states could not
be rolled back. Moreover, in ICE the speed of updates to
state-continuous modules is only limited by the processor
and (untrusted) non-volatile memory, not by the TPM chip.
Special-Purpose Applications.
Chun et al. proposed the creation of append-only mem-
ory [10] to harden existing distributed algorithms to defend
against equivocation: making different statements to differ-
ent nodes in the network. An implementation with a mini-
mal TCB was left as future work.
Levin et al. propose TrInc [21], a specialized system to
attest successive monotonic counters, to achieve similar re-
sults. TrInc assumes a dedicated device that is able to lo-
cally store attestation requests of monotonic counters. In
the event of an unexpected loss of power, clients can request
the last signed attestations. This approach is similar to so-
lutions were disk space is isolated, but incurs only a limited
TCB. ICE provides a more generic, low-overhead alternative
with only limited hardware modifications.
More recently Kotla et al. proposed a system [19] that
allows offline data access while guaranteeing that (1) a user
cannot deny offline accesses without failing an audit and (2)
after proving that a user did not access the data, it cannot
be accessed in the future. While their solution is interesting
and does not require any software to be trusted, it only
solves state-continuity in this specific setting.
9. CONCLUSION
Providing support for state continuity is challenging as in-
cluding non-volatile memory on-chip requires modification
of fabrication processes. But off-chip storage of freshness
information can be slow (e.g. TPM NVRAM) or vulnerable
to attack. We presented ICE, a state-continuous system and
algorithm with two important properties: (1) only at boot
time is the (slow) TPM chip accessed. State updates after
the system booted only require updates to dedicated regis-
ters backed off-chip by a capacitor and non-volatile memory.
(2) ICE is a passive security measure. An attacker interrupt-
ing the main power supply or any other source of power,
cannot break state-continuity. We believe that the impor-
tance of ICE lies in the fact that it shows that with only
limited and cheap hardware support, it enables the develop-
ment of software-only implementations of trusted computing
primitives. This presents an interesting direction for future
versions or revisions of hardware security modules (e.g., the
TPM chip) and may provide an interesting approach to in-
crease security in low-end, resource-constrained applications
such as sensor networks.
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